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The purpose of this dissertation is to access the desirability of
controls on capital movements in South Africa. In line with the
general international tendencies towards liberalisation, in
recent years there has been increased pressure to lift exchange
controls. Despite these pressures, some economists believe there
is a need for the maintenance of controls. These arguments are
based on issues relating to the inherent desirability of controls
as well as the appropriate preconditions for liberalisation. The
paper investigates the preconditions for capital account
liberalisation, drawing on international experience, and
considers whether or not they have been fulfilled in South
Africa. In addition, the proper sequencing of capital opening
itself is examined.
A literature survey is the main research method used, utilising
the literature on financial reforms of some less developed
countries. The countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America
(Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) are used to illustrate examples of
failed experiences.
In the light of the lessons learned from the above, the major










abolished, although gradually; (2) macroeconomic stability is the
key to successful liberalisation; and (3) a fairly liberal
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In recent years there has been a marked move in the developing
countries towards greater liberalisation of both trade and
capital accounts of the balance of payments. Despite the fact
that there were failed attempts at capital account liberalisation
in the Southern Cone of Latin America during the 1970s, many
countries have now proceeded along this path, with different
degrees of success. In South Africa there has been increased
pressure for the relaxation of exchange controls and although the
new government has in principle accepted the desirability of free
flows of capital, there has been a reluctance to move too hastily
in that direction. The major concern is with the imact effect of
abolition as it is difficult to predict the precise effect of
such a move on interest rates, prices, the exchane rate and/or
foreign exchange reserves.
International experience with liberalisation has been mixed.
There are many cases of successful liberalisation as well as
failures. This paper will attempt to draw conclusions for South
Africa on the bases of theoretical consideratios as well as from
learning from the mistakes of liberalising countries.
Capital account liberalisation is a complex issue because efforts
towards capital account convertibility have usually occurred in
the context of broader economic programmes which have
incorporated extensive stabilisation efforts and structural











reforms and other policy changes have to be addressed in a study
of capital account liberalisation in developing countries.
In this thesis, the discussion focuses on the reasons for and
against capital account reform; the sequencing of reform; and the
experiences of the Southern Cone countries of Latin America with
reform. Considerable attention is also given to the effects of
capital flows on such key economic variables as exchange rates,
foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, investment, and
savings. The aim is to draw implications for South Africa.
The paper is structured as follows: chapter 1 explores the need
for capital account liberalisation. Various arguments that
support the opening of the capital account are discussed. Chapter
2 prsents the arguments for the maintenance of restrictions on
international capital flows, with an emphasis on the need to stem
capital flight.
Chapter 3 surveys the literature on the sequencing of capital
account reform. Sequencing raises numerous questions such as
whether external (current or capital account) liberalisation
should precede internal liberalisation (i.e. domestic financial
reform), the appropriate sequencing of current and capital
account liberalisation, and the preconditions for capital account
opening.
Chapter 4 analyses the financial reform experiences of the











countries constitute a significant portion of the literature on
financial liberalisation.
Chapter 5 also looks at the need to maintain controls, but
focuses mainly on the problems of capital inflows. This has
become a cause for concern in Latin America over the past few
years This chapter will consider the reasons for these inflows,
their implications and ways to deal with them.
Chapter 6 looks at the South African experience. The main dilemma
in South Africa is the timing and sequencing of capital account
liberalisation. The chapter therefore looks at the present nature
of SA capital controls; the preconditions for a successful












Need for Capital Account Liberalisation
There is general agreement that the ultimate objectives of
capital account liberalisation are in part to improve financial
efficiency by increasing competition in domestic financial
systems (Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993), and to stimulate
growth. Numerous reasons why capital account convertibility is
necessary are often cited. This chapter looks at (1) the economic
arguments for capital account opening and (2) the ineffectiveness
of controls arguments.
1.1 Economic Arguments for Openness
One of the arguments against capital controls is based on welfare
considerations. Cuddington, for example, notes that "laissez-
faire proponents maintain that unrestricted capital flows are
welfare enhancing because, among other things, they increase the
international pool of loanable funds." (Cuddington, 1986: 33).
Furthermore, Pastor (1990) argues that orthodox economists
contend that controls can actually encourage capital flight
because of the negative signals such government interference
sends to local investors.
Hanson (1992) emphasises the traditional welfare analysis of
capital account liberalisation which pertains to the benefits of











foreign investment is seen to be financing needed capital goods
and, simultaneously, resolving the transfer problem by taking
away excess production. The country is left better-off because
of the higher demand for labour that has been created in the
process.
Fischer and Reisen (1992) assert that dismantling capital
controls is generally presumed to generate economic benefits
through increased opportunities for intertemporal trade and
cross-border portfolio diversification in both assets and
liabilities. The diversification allows the country's borrowers
to find lower funding costs and its savers prospects for higher
yields.
With respect to intertemporal trade, Hanson (1992) and Fischer
and Reisen (1992) argue that intertemporal considerations enter
only to the extent that differences in time preferences explain
differences in saving and, ultimately, in factor proportions. An
example of a benefit that results from intertemporal trade is
when Southern Hemisphere producers export temperate zone products
produced during their summer to the Northern Hemisphere during
its winter. The situation is reversed during the next season.
Another argument raised by Hanson (1992) concerns the benefits
arising from risk-bearing and risk-sharing in international
financial markets. If the prices for sharing and bearing certain
risks differ between countries, then there would be trade in the











The inflow of new real capital in the domestic economy reduces
the real interest rate and in that way helps reduce the capital
market disequilibrium in relation to other world economies
(Harberger, 1982).
Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) hold that capital
availability in the domestic economy is enhanced by capital
inflows. These inflows enable the domestic agents to smooth out
their consumption over time and investors to react timely to
expected changes in their profitability. Furthermore, capital
inflows can give important signals to participants in world
financial markets. Agents can interpret an increase in capital
inflows as reflecting an opportune investment climate in the
receiving country.
Additional benefits of capital account liberalisation according
to Williamson (1991) are:
* Portfolio Diversification from which the residents can
gain. This is often defended on moral grounds as being a basic
human right for people to protect their hard-earned assets by
spreading them geographically.
* Investment Stimulus which is provided by the relaxation of
capital controls.
*Administrative Economies because capital controls require
public servants to administer them and thus their abolition
results in a saving in public expenditure.











abolition of capital controls, local investors have to compete
with foreigners for international investments which are likely
to have high yields.
1.2 Ineffectiveness of Canital Controls
Gros (1987) and Khan and Ul Hague (1987), amongst others, argue
that capital controls work only for a short period before
rational economic agents find ways to circumvent them. They cite
various ways in which the controls can be evaded. One such method
is trade misinvoicing. It happens in the following ways:
(a) Import Over-invoicing
An importer pays more than he or she should for the
imported goods. The importer would pay the supplier, say, $20 for
a product that actually costs $15. The difference is then
deposited abroad.
(b)Export Under-invoicing
An exporter presents a fictitious invoice to exchange
control authorities that reflects a good sold for, say, $15
whereas the real price charged the buyer is $20. The buyer abroad
then places the difference into a foreign account.
Eaton (1987) observes that capital controls become self defeating
in that they exacerbate the very defects that they sought to
eliminate. For example, expectations of controls might induce












At times capital controls attack symptoms rather than addressing
the underlying cause of the problem. According to Cuddington
(1986), "[f] light capital might be a symptom of macroeconomic
mismanagement thus the haemorrhage will be curbed by the
application of sensible and credible policies (Cuddington, 1986:
33)."
Also, in an era of capital mobility, as more countries liberalise
and as capital mobility increases, it becomes less feasible or
desirable to maintain controls. If liberalised capital accounts
are seen as the norm, foreign investors see controls as a
negative signal and thus refrain from investing in that
particular economy. Furthermore, increased capital mobility
increases opportunities for arbitrage and therefore reduces
effectiveness of controls on residents.
The reduced effectiveness of capital controls implies that the
formulation of macroeconomic and structural policies may be more
constrained (Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993). Despite unchanged
external financial market conditions, for example, capital
control evasion by domestic residents means that unstable
domestic monetary and financial policies that result in a large
differential between the expected real returns on domestic and
external assets lead to capital flight, an increasing
dollarisation of the economy, and a smaller domestic monetary
system and domestic tax base. With a shrinking domestic financial
system, the revenues accruing to the authorities from an











In addition, ineffectiveness of capital controls "can also make
it more difficult for the authorities to tax financial income,
transactions, and wealth." (Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993:
19). High taxes on financial income and wealth, for example, can
create a strong incentive for domestic agents to hold a large
proportion of their wealth in external assets which are less
taxed or not taxed at all. New taxes and/or cuts in government
spending will consequently be necessary as the ineffectiveness











Arguments for Capital Controls
Restrictions on capital flows have been justified on four broad
grounds (Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993): (a) to help control
balance of payments crises or unstable exchange rates resulting
from excessively volatile short-run capital flows, (b) to
restrict foreign ownership of domestic factors of production and
to help channel domestic savings towards financing domestic
investment, (c) to enable the authorities to tax domestic
financial activities, income, and wealth, and (d) to prevent the
disruptive effects of capital flows on stabilisation and
structural reform programmes. This chapter, expands on the above
reasons for capital controls in the context of (1) the negative
impacts of capital flight: its causes and consequences; (2)
economic crises; and (3) the effectiveness of controls.
2.1 Economic Arguments Against openness
The traditional analysis maintains that there would be net
capital outflows (capital flight) in some countries if the
capital account were liberalised (Hanson, 1992). This would be
even more acute in developing countries because of undeveloped
financial markets, and the reduction of domestic capital in











It is also argued that exchange controls are necessary on
outflows of capital because holding foreign currency deposits
abroad and the borrowing of domestic firms and individuals abroad
are methods of escaping from the domestic inflation tax. [See
Khan and Ul Haque (1985)].
Another argument mentions that the use of controls becomes
justified in developing countries in situations of uncertainty
about political and economic prospects. This uncertainty leads
to large capital outflows. Consequently, macroeconomic policies
on their own may not be sufficient tools for preventing capital
flight.
In short, therefore, the main reason for the existence of capital
controls is to eradicate or alleviate the negative consequences
of capital flight (which are discussed in section 2.1.3 below).
2.1.1 What is Capital Fliaht?
There are conflicting views about the definition of capital
flight among economists. Khan and Ul Haque (1987) assert that
different writers use different concepts when discussing capital
flight, and particularly when measuring it. Most definitions of
capital flight are determined to a large extent by the author's
views on whether capital flight is "good" or "bad". "It is
difficult - perhaps impossible - to make a rigorous definition
of capital flight for the purpose of devising policies to cope











Cumby and Levich (1987) hold that the definition of capital
flight requires some arbitrary distinction between normal capital
outflows and those labelled as capital flight (abnormal
outflows). This distinction is one of the reasons that make it
difficult to come up with a single definition.
Walter (1987) defines capital flight as a subset of international
redeployments or portfolio adjustments that occur in the presence
of conflict between the objectives of asset holders and
governments. Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993: 15), however,
assume capital flight to be a proxy' "for the portfolio
decisions of domestic residents regarding the proportions of
their wealth that they hold in domestic or foreign assets." The
proportions held in these assets depend on the expected real
returns and risks associated with holding each type of asset.
Other definitions of capital flight include:
* All private capital outflows from developing countries, be
they short-term or long-term, portfolio or equity
investments. (Khan and Ul Hague, 1987)
* The difference between total private capital outflows and
the part for which income is identified and reported.(Khan and
Ul Hague, 1987)
* Resident outflows that flee abnormal risk. (Lessard and
Williamson, 1987; Smit and Mocke, 1991)
* All resident capital outflows. (Pastor,1990)
'This, however, is not necessarily a definition , but











A further point raised by Pastor (1990) and Cuddington (1986) is
that capital movements from developing countries are called
"flight" whereas those from industrialised countries are termed
"foreign investment". This further complicates the question of
definition. Also, as a caveat, capital flight should not be
restricted to illegal resident capital outflows as this would
exclude the possibility of capital flight from countries which
do not have exchange controls.
2.1.2 What Causes Capital Flight?
According to Pastor (1990), capital flight occurs when
individuals decide to reallocate their assets from domestic to
foreign assets. Three basic forms of assets are available; (a)
holdings of money or currency, (b) savings in the domestic
financial system, or (c) investment in real productive activity.
Regarding the reallocation of assets, when financial reform is
contemplated in developing countries, cognisance should be taken
of their legacy of widespread controls, the need for domestic
savings to finance new investment, and the often high degree of
political instability. Since exchange controls have for a long
time featured prominently in LDCs, investment decisions have been
dictated by this fact. As a result, a sudden lifting of exchange
controls would result in a significant portfolio reallocation.












Khan and Ul Hague (1987) cite the following five causes of
capital flight:
* Overvaluation of the Exchanae Rate
There is consensus that one of the principal causes of
capital flight is the likelihood of a change in the exchange
rate. The expected depreciation of the domestic currency
causes residents to switch to foreign currencies.
* Financial Sector Constraints
In a number of developing countries there are extensive
controls on interest rates and other aspects of the
financial market. Often these practices result in nominal
interest rates that are below the rates on comparable
foreign financial instruments as well as in negative real
rates of interest. In such a situation it is rational for the
domestic investor to seek foreign assets that have higher
yields. The higher interest rates in receiving countries such as
the US are therefore some of the external incentives that
encourage capital inflows from the developing countries.
* Fiscal Deficits
In many instances, particularly in Latin America, capital
flight has been associated with growing fiscal deficits. A
widening fiscal deficit financed by printing money creates
'Although it is generally expected that capital outflows
would follow liberalisation, the possibility of net inflows
cannot be ignored. Capital inflows could cause an appreciation
of the currency, which undermines the competitiveness of the
tradable goods industries, and thus brings export-led growth to











inflationary pressures Consequently, residents reduce their
domestic money balances to avoid an erosion of the value of
their assets. As one alternative, they purchase foreign
currency to avoid this "inflation tax".
* The Risk Factor
It can be argued that there are relatively higher perceived
risks associated with investments in developing countries,  and
that this difference in relative risks stems from the
characteristics of developing countries that distinguish them
from the developed economies.
Alesina and Tabellini (1989) and Cuddington (1986) mention
widespread political uncertainty about future governments in
developing countries as the reason for high economic uncertainty
about future economic policies. Capital flight, therefore becomes
an insurance against the risk of future taxation or
expropriation.
In developing countries the domestic resident faces the
possibility of losing the value of his or her assets without
compensation [see Khan and Ul Hague (1985)], whereas the risk on











2.1.3 The Consequences of Capital Fliaht
Short- and Lona-Run Effects 
Capital flight has both short-run and long-run effects that can
create serious economic problems for the domestic authorities,
and these are:
* Short-run Effects 
A sudden increase in the outflow of capital has
destabilising effects on the domestic interest rates,
exchange rates, and the country's international reserve
position (Hanson, 1992; Cumby and Levich, 1987).
* Lona-run Effects 
If capital flight is permanent, that is, the resources are lost
by the home country, then there are several long term effects
on the economy such as a reduction in available  resources to
finance domestic investment.
Pastor (1990) cites three major consequences of capital flight:
* A reduction in growth potential
* An erosion of the tax base
* A redistribution of income from poorer to richer
groups.
(a) The Growth Cost of Capital Fliaht 
There are two ways in which capital flight can limit future
growth:











domestic investment required for development. If domestic
residents invest abroad, such investments contribute more to the
development of receiving countries than they do for the source
country. This reduces both current and future domestic investment
and, consequently, current and future growth.
In addition to the impact on growth, Rodriguez (1987) argues that
investment abroad results in the transnationalisation of domestic
capital whereby the investors from developing countries obtain
substantial holdings in corporations in OECD countries. This
makes it difficult for domestic funds to return to source
countries because of the nature of these investments. Capital
mobility is reduced when funds have purchased firms or
corporations than the case would have been had they been held in
the form of financial assets. This makes it highly unlikely that
capital flows will return once the causes of capital flight have
been removed.
(ii) Reduction of growth potential via imports. Capital
invested abroad could be used domestically to produce importables
that would bring in foreign capital that is essential for growth.
(b) Erosion of the Tax Base
Capital flight removes both stocks of wealth and earnings from
the economy by making it easier for residents to transfer their
capital to foreign institutions beyond the reach of local
authorities. This creates problems for domestic authorities by
shrinking the taxable assets and income of those most able to











According to Hanson (1992) and Gros (1987) open capital markets
are an impediment to the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal
policies. This assertion, as it applies to fiscal policy, is
based partly on the possibility of avoiding taxes when the
capital account is open.
Furthermore, as a result of the reduced tax base because of
capital flight, social infrastructure projects which might
otherwise have been financed through tax revenues would have to
be financed by borrowing from abroad to finance the increased
fiscal deficit. These projects may generate high social returns
which are also enjoyed by holders of assets abroad who escape
taxes. The required additional foreign borrowing generates an
additional debt burden and possible future debt-servicing
problems
(c) Distributional Consequences 
While the poor suffer austerity so that their governments can
service debt, a substantial portion of these hard-earned interest
payments to international creditors makes its way back to those
in developing countries who are wealthy enough
to hold foreign assets (Diaz-Alejandro, 1984).
Debt Accumulation and Simultaneous Borrowing and Lending
Often the existence of capital flight is concealed by the fact
that it is financed by capital inflows. On the face of it,
simultaneous inflows and outflows should not be a problem. But











if a crisis (political or economic) occurs, foreign capital will
go out but resident capital will not come back. The result is a
debt crisis. Therefore, the simultaneous existence of capital
inflows and outflows in this situation leaves the developing
economies vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. This phenomenon has
been analysed in detail by Khan and Ul Hague (1987).
Than and Ul Hague's model tries to explain why residents in
developing countries often choose to invest their savings abroad
at the same time that they are seeking external finance. The
authors maintain that there are two separate agents - the
government and private individuals - engaged in such operations.
That is, it is the government that borrows in external markets
for its financial needs, while at the same time private
individuals invest their funds abroad.
To explain this phenomenon of simultaneous borrowing and
investing in international capital markets, the authors introduce
uncertainty into the analysis and assume that the domestic and
foreign environments are characterised by different sources of
uncertainty. They argue that, once this asymmetry is established,
it is possible to show that it is rational for domestic residents
to borrow abroad, use the proceeds of such borrowings to finance
domestic investment, and at the same time invest their domestic
savings abroad.
The analysis is based on the view that there are relatively











countries than in investing in developed countries. This
difference in relative risks is due to characteristics of
developing countries that distinguish them from developed
economies. Most developed economies have well-established
political systems with constitutional arrangements that provide
an institutional infrastructure for efficient market
transactions, developing countries are generally lacking in this
regard and generally have a high expropriation rate. As a result,
the pattern of simultaneous borrowing and investing abroad is
theoretically justifiable.
Behind Than and Ul Hague's paper is the view that the rapid rise
in the foreign debt of many developing countries has financed
capital flight rather than productive investments.
Domestic residents are aware of the relative higher risks
involved in investing at home rather than abroad. Hence,
residents of developing countries choose to invest domestic
savings in the international capital markets while using foreign
financing for domestic investment.
In order to increase the incentives to invest domestically, the
following policy options are suggested:
* Adopting sound macroeconomic policies can be a key element in
reducing resource transfers abroad and avoiding the attendant
problems this phenomenon creates for capital-scarce economies.
* Full compensation to domestic investors in the event of
government expropriation is another policy possibility. But this











hard to assess objectively. Whether domestic investors will
believe that they will be compensated, particularly when there
is a change of regimes, is difficult to determine.
* Guarantees against expropriation and against the imposition of
exchange controls provided by an international agency may
encourage domestic residents to repatriate funds held abroad
* Since one of the reasons for the continual outflow of capital
from developing countries is often the lack of suitable financial
assets, the provision of such assets at attractive terms may also
serve to keep capital flight in check.
* The imposition of capital controls is another policy that can
be implemented. Khan and Ul Hague mention that there is evidence
that the amount of capital flight from several countries depend
to some extend on the degree of capital controls.
2.2 Economic Crises
Controls are often used to overcome particular economic crises.
This is illustrated in Wyplosz (1986) model which focuses on the
fixed exchange rate system. This model is an adaptation from
Flood and Garber (1984) in order to introduce capital controls.
Despite the fact that the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of
exchange controls have been widely documented in the literature,
most countries continue to have or enforce some form or another
of restrictions on capital flows. Observations show that
restrictions are strengthened when the pressure builds up on a











prevails. The implication is that controls are useful mainly
during crisis periods.
Wyplosz, therefore, models the balance of payments crises in the
presence of exchange restrictions. He considers the case of a
country facing the prospect of a devaluation of its currency;
where outflows of speculative funds might result as a consequence
of this devaluation. He asserts that the capital controls that
are aimed at restricting this potential amount of speculative
funds should target the domestic currency assets which can be
easily transferred offshore in a crisis situation. The crisis he
considers is the one in which there exists an inflation
differential between the country under study and the rest of the
world.
Wyplosz concludes that if exchange market operators are endowed
with perfect foresight, a fixed exchange rate system cannot
sustain a balance of payments crisis. Therefore, he suggests that
in the short-run, exchange rates must be allowed to float.
Exchange controls are a way of maintaining the principle of fixed
parities at the cost of periodic distinct changes. Two other
solutions can be entertained:
the introduction of enough uncertainty (regarding the
timing and the size of the parity changes, the level of
reserves, the course of monetary policy, and other
factors); or












In all, the choice of the best tool to use (assuming that a fixed
exchange regime is necessary) should be based on welfare
considerations.
2.3 Effectiveness of Controls Arguments
Although it is generally accepted that controls are not
completely effective, proponents of controls contend that the
existence of leakages negates the usefulness of controls.
Referring to LDCs where capital controls are widespread, Pastor
(1990) argues that developing countries with capital controls
have tended to exhibit lower levels of capital flight. Korea is
one case in point. It maintained tight capital controls
throughout her financial liberalisation process and the result
was phenomenal economic growth with minimal loss of capital.
Similarly, Brazil and Columbia, which maintained exchange
controls, experienced proportionately less capital flight than
other major Latin American countries. This can be attributed to
the capital controls themselves or the macroeconomic policies
made possible because of the controls. Therefore, although not
100 percent effective, capital controls do provide some
insulation by increasing the cost of flows.
Khan and Ul Hague (1987) and Williamson (1991) argue that capital
controls may curb capital flight by increasing the costs of
moving funds abroad. Tax information-sharing agreement is an











agents who want to invest abroad would have to consider the legal
repercussions of doing so. They will have to seek legal counsel
before embarking on tax evasion thus incurring extra costs than













The Sequencing of Capital Account Liberalisation
As argued by Edwards (1984), many of the liberalisation attempts
in Latin America in the late '70s and '80s failed not because
liberalisation itself was inappropriate, but because of the
nature of the reform process itself Chapters 2 and 5 highlight
some of the problems of opening the capital account. This chapter
considers the problems that may arise in the process of
liberalisation.
The reform process is a difficult task that requires appropriate
and well-thought planning. What makes it even more complicated
is that there are no specific rules or formulae that should be
followed. Each reform process requires its own particular
solution that is partly dictated by the relevant country's
initial conditions. As Choksi and Papageorgiou (1986: 1) note,
"...the desirable transitional path to follow will depend on the
specific institutions and economic situation of the individual
countries." As a result, there are still no definite answers
about the sequencing and speed of financial liberalisation.
3.1 Before Liberalising the Capital Account
Fischer and Reisen (1992) address the question of the appropriate











appropriate moment for opening up the capital account. They
assert that stabilisation, both fiscal and monetary, as well as
domestic financial liberalisation should precede external
liberalisation.
3.1.1 Stabilisation
Stabilisation programmes in the developing countries are often
embarked upon after the pernicious policies of populist regimes.
Often, with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the government would initiate a stabilisation programme (Diaz-
Alejandro, 1981) Such a programme usually includes:
* a restoration of balance-of-payments equilibrium (This is
where the stabilisation plans achieve their clearest and
quickest success.);
* the orderly servicing of the foreign debt;
* the control and elimination of inflation;
* the creation of a structure of relative prices conducive to
an efficient allocation of resources; and
* reducing fiscal deficits to sustainable levels.
According to Cho and Khatkhate (1989: xvi), macroeconomic
stability is the "linchpin" of successful liberalisation.
There are, however, numerous cases of failed stabilisation
episodes in developing countries, in the Southern Cone in
particular (Diaz-Alejandro, 1981). The basic failures are the
inability to bring inflation down to acceptable world levels, and











Also, when dealing with stabilisation, it is difficult to
distinguish between economic and political considerations. As
Black (1981:47) notes, "[p]olitical instability is a noneconomic
factor that maybe very important in causing economic instability
in specific countries at specific times."
3.1.2 Domestic Financial Liberalisation
Domestic financial reforms are a prerequisite for successful
external liberalisation. These reforms also help enhance the
competence of domestic institutions. Krueger (1984: 403) notes
that "[t]he highly successful developing countries have generally
had liberalized trade and payments regimes, which in turn have
been feasible only with relatively liberal domestic economic
policies" (my emphasis).
The experiences of the Southern Cone countries attest to this
(see chapter 4). The reform initiatives of the Southern Cone
countries were disastrous partly because they liberalised their
capital accounts before a significant number of their financial
institutions had attained international competence. Financial
repression also meant that when the capital account was opened,
substantial capital outflows resulted. The liberalisation
attempts of some Asian countries such as Korea and Malaysia, on
the other hand, were relatively successful because their
financial institutions were already fairly competitive before












3.2.1 General Pointers About External Liberalisation
Sequencing External Liberalisation
An extensive body of literature focuses on the question of
sequencing external liberalisation, i.e. whether the capital
account or the current account should be opened first.
Hanson (1992) quotes McKinnon (1973) as saying that the initial
view on sequencing was that the capital account restrictions
should be relaxed only after trade reform (see section 3.2.2 for
more discussion). This is a widely accepted proposition. The
minority view among economists is that the capital account should
be opened first, or simultaneously, with the trade account.
Some proponents of the capital-account-first view are Paul Clark
(1986) and Anne Krueger (1988). This view holds that financial
assistance during transition is necessary because an increased
availability of funds can help reduce the adjustment cost
associated with micro reforms (Edwards, 1989).
According to Edwards (1987), frequently (due to political or
other problems) it is not possible to pursue the liberalisation
of both the trade and capital accounts simultaneously, and from
the efficiency stand point it may not even be desirable to do so.











instability and the consequent uncertainty about the future
economic prospects, there are high probabilities of damaging
capital outflows which may undermine the liberalisation
initiatives. Therefore, for the sake of prudence, it might be
necessary to delay abolishing capital restrictions on outflows
whilst restrictions on inflows have been lifted.
Sequencing Capital and Current Accounts Themselves
Fischer and Reisen (1992) note that, since there are a variety
of capital flows on which controls are often imposed, the
policymaker can also sequence the process of capital account
liberalisation itself.
Similarly, Anjaria (1987) states that trade liberalisation itself
needs to be sequenced. The first concern is the optimal speed of
this liberalisation. However, the experiences of the developing
countries give no indication of whether or not trade
liberalisation should be massive and quick or gradual.
Capital Account Convertibility: Preconditions
According to Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993), it is highly
possible to sustain capital account convertibility if countries
implement certain policies before initiating capital account
reform. The first such key macroeconomic precondition is a fiscal
reform that drastically reduces the fiscal deficit and finances











The second concerns the strengthening the prudential supervision
of financial institutions as well as carefully formulating
financial policies that establish more flexible interest rates,
restructure and recapitalise domestic financial institutions, and
more succinctly define the scope of the protection offered by the
official safety net that underlies the domestic financial system.
The third is a strong domestic financial system that can compete
effectively with external financial institutions and withstand
the effects of high asset price variability.
The fourth is that the authorities must take steps to curb the
moral hazards associated with maintaining an official safety net
under a financial system with an open capital account in order
to avoid the likely fiscal costs associated with maintaining such
a safety net.
The fifth is to remove capital controls and establish capital
account convertibility which will bring new financial techniques













As mentioned above, the widely accepted view is that trade
account liberalisation should precede the opening of the capital
account. Some proponents of this idea are Mckinnon (1973, 1982),
Frenkel (1982) and Rodrik (1987). The rest of this section gives
some reasons for the current-account-first notion.
The trade-account first idea is based on the fact that there is
a fundamental difference between the goods and asset markets. The
speed of adjustment in the asset markets is much faster than the
speed of adjustment in the goods markets. Asset markets are more
sensitive to speculative considerations or to expectations
concerning the distant future. New information which alters
expectations is reflected in asset prices much faster than in the
prices of goods and services. This basic difference in the
fundamental characteristics of goods and assets contains several
implications that support the trade-account first argument.
Firstly, in economies which have been distorted for some time
nobody can safely predict the paths that the various sectors will
follow after liberalisation. The trade-account first approach has
the advantage of providing the policymaker with time to monitor
the market's reaction and to rectify errors if need be. The
capital-account first idea, because of the speed with which asset
markets adjust, lacks this advantage. Once the capital account
is opened up, the initial reaction is likely to be very fast and











result in inappropriate resource allocation effects.
Secondly, from the social viewpoint, it is easier to reverse
wrong portfolio decisions than to reverse real investment
decisions. When the distortions are removed in the commodity
markets and the current account is opened, real investment in the
economy will be based on the undistorted environment. Portfolio
investments will continue to be based on the distorted capital
market as long as the capital account is not opened. Once the
capital account is liberalised, some of these portfolio decisions
will have to be reversed. On the other hand if the capital
account is being opened first, portfolio decisions are likely to
correspond to the long-run undistorted conditions, but real
investment will take place in a distorted environment as long as
the trade account is not opened. Due to the distortions, the
social cost of the investment is likely to exceed the private
cost. As a result of the difference between the private and
social costs, it likely that the first order will be preferred.
Thirdly, when the trade account is opened up first, the cost of
the remaining distortion, i.e., of the closed capital account,
is proportional to the volume of trade which, due to the slow
adjustment of the market for goods, is likely to be relatively
small. On the other hand when the capital account is opened up
first, the cost of the remaining distortion, i.e., of the closed
trade account, is proportional to the volume of capital flows











to be large. This comparison therefore suggests that the trade
account should be liberalised first.
3.2.3 Sequencing Capital Account Opening
In reality, the "current-account-first" idea does not necessarily
mean that the opening of the capital account should be strictly
undertaken after the trade account reforms have been totally
completed. It is a question of degree. That is, it is only after
some major distortions in the current account have been removed
that capital account liberalisation can be initiated.
Having accepted the "current-account-first" view, the issue is
that the capital account liberalisation itself might need to be
sequenced. This is particularly relevant to countries with a long
tradition of controls such as South Africa where residents could
not invest abroad.
In South Africa, for example, lifting controls could cause major
outflows from such institutions as insurance companies and
pension funds and result in real exchange rate overshooting.
Therefore, this might provide a case for sequencing capital
account liberalisation. That is, lifting controls on non-
residents first, then on certain categories of residents, and
phase in to avoid major impacts on interest rates and exchange













Other economists have proposed alternative sequencings. These
economists are divided into the "liberalise first" and "stabilise
first " camps. The former is mainly represented by Krueger
(1981); the latter consists of McKinnon (1984), Fischer (1986,
1987) and Sachs (1987, 1988).
The "liberalise firsts" argue that there is little connection
between disinflation and liberalisation policies, and that the
costs of trade restrictions are too high to justify the
postponement of liberalisation until the macroeconomy has
regained equilibrium. In addition, they maintain that,
irrespective of macroeconomic instability, the opening of both
trade and capital accounts should proceed. The real contention
will be on the sequencing of the liberalisation of these
accounts.
The "stabilise firsts" have based their arguments on such
considerations as the historical difficulty of avoiding
overvaluation in countries with high fiscal deficits and the
relationship between inflation, relative price variability and
resource allocation. Pertaining to capital account reform, they
contend that if macroeconomic instability is unresolved it could
make the liberalisation of both trade and capital accounts
ineffectual Therefore it is sensible to stem instability first.











it is very general and no systematic attempt has been made to
analyse the historical evidence (see Edwards, 1989). Moreover,
most of these studies have not made a clear distinction between
different degrees of trade reform (as it has been done with













The Southern Cone Experience 
An analysis of examples of some countries' experiences with
financial reform is a logical progression from a discussion of
the sequencing of liberalisation. The primary purpose is to
examine the role of the capital account in these reform
initiatives. The aim of this analysis is to help in determining
South Africa's economic prospects in chapter 6. The assertion
that there are no ready-made rules that are applicable to all
reform processes will be supported. One basic conclusion that
does emerge is the need for appropriate macroeconomic policy.
A group of countries has been used in this analysis: the Southern
Cone of Latin America (Chile, Uruguay and Argentina). The
Southern Cone is important to LDCs' observers and policymakers
who seek to initiate financial reform because they fear the
repetition of the type of economic disasters which occurred in
the Latin American countries. As a result, an understanding of
what happened there might help in determining which measures
should be avoided. The structural reforms of the Southern Cone
constitute much of the emerging literature on the sequencing of
financial reform including capital account liberalisation.
The discussion of this group of countries in this chapter looks
at the situation before the reforms, during the reform, and the











4.1 Conditions on the Eve of Reforms
Uruguay, Chile and Argentina had largely similar macroeconomic
backgrounds, social structures, cultural heritage and historical
circumstances. As Corbo, de Melo and Tybout (1986) observe, for
decades these countries pursued inward-looking development
strategies that relied heavily on government intervention. They
all had extensive capital controls. On the eve of reforms, the
main macro imbalances facing the Southern Cone were the surging
inflation and the debilitating external account deficit.
During 1971-73, in Chile, the capital account surplus of the
balance of payments in relation to the GDP was at an average
annual rate of 2.8%, whereas the current account deficit was at
3.2% (Cho and Khatkhate, 1989). The annual growth rate of GDP was
0.7% during 1971-73; and the fixed investment growth rate was
minus 9.8%. The average annual rate of inflation was 150%; it was
exacerbated by average fiscal deficits of 12.5% of GDP and was
financed chiefly by borrowing from the Central Bank.
In Argentina, during 1971-73, the balance of payments was also
under pressure (no conclusive data is available). The average
rate of growth of real GDP was 2.8% during 1971-75. The rate of
inflation was around 82% in the same period. The fiscal deficit
was at 12% of GDP.
In 1971-73, in Uruguay the capital account surplus was at an











surplus was at 0.52% of GDP. The average growth rate of GDP
during 1971-75 was only 1.6% in Uruguay. The gross fixed
investment as a percentage of GDP was at an average of 10.8%;
whilst the domestic savings were at an average of 12.3% of GDP.
The fiscal deficit was relatively low at 3.5% of GDP.
In the early 1970s all three countries began the liberalisation
of their markets although in various degrees and approaches.
4.2 Conditions During the Reforms
At the beginning of the reforms, in all three countries, some
efficiency gains were made. With the stabilisation policies in
full swing, for example, the rate of inflation declined: in Chile
to 40.2% in 1978 from 600% in 1974; in Argentina to 171% from
444% in 1976; in Uruguay to 44.6% from 51% in 1976. Although in
each case the rates were reduced, they still remained high by
international standards.
Also, the overall balance of payments position improved in each
country. In Chile, the capital account surplus as a percentage
of GDP moved from 1.85 in 1974 to 12.74 in 1978, whereas the
current account deficit to GDP moved from 2.64 to 7.06. In
Argentina, the capital account surplus in relation to GDP moved
from 1.04 % in 1976 to 0.47% in 1978, the current account
surplus, on the other hand, moved from 1.50% to 2.86%. In
Uruguay, during 1976-78, the capital account surplus as a











the current account deficit was at a yearly average of 2.73%.
The fiscal deficit in Chile was almost eliminated in 1978,
decreasing from an average of 10.6% during 1971-73 and there was
eventually a surplus beginning in 1979. In Argentina, the fall
in fiscal deficit was from 12.5% in 1976 to 3.8% of GDP in 1978.
In Uruguay in 1978 it dropped to 0.9% from 3.5 % of GDP on the
eve of reform; and it was eliminated in 1979.
However, the initial efficiency gains were eventually
overshadowed by problems with policy inconsistencies,
implementation difficulties, and overlooked market frictions. In
all three countries, very high interest rates and the continuous
overvaluation of the pesos eventually led to bankruptcies.
4.2.1 Uruguay
In Uruguay after the military take over in 1973 the authorities
embarked on the liberalisation of their economy's tightly
regulated financial system (de Melo and Tybout, 1986). The
Uruguayan financial reforms were accompanied by major macro-
stabilisation programmes. According to Hanson and de Melo (1985),
restrictions on private capital flows were almost eliminated in
late 1974 and Uruguayan residents were allowed to hold foreign
exchange.
By the end of 1976, directed programmes had been largely











1977, the authorities embarked on the elimination of reserve
requirements and numerous other regulations, leaving the
Uruguayan central bank virtually free of government controls.
In October 1978, however, the government adopted the policy of
announcing in advance the future values of the exchange rate (the
tablita) as an anti-inflationary tool. The financial reforms, and
the macro-stabilisation programmes and policies (including the
tablita) eventually combined to generate serious problems.
In the early 1980s, difficulties started to arise in connection
with the implementation of the anti-inflationary (tablita)
programme. The result was a gradual loss of confidence in the
schedule of preannounced devaluation, which eventually undermined
the stabilisation plan and endangered the liberalisation. The
tablita was abandoned in November 1982, and the reforms were
eventually aborted.
Besides the advent of the tablita, there is no general
explanation for the causes of the reform failure. However, a few
issues need to be emphasised particularly with respect to the
capital account.
Restrictions on capital movements were immediately removed at the
beginning of the reforms. Capital account liberalisation preceded
stabilisation, which is not conducive to a successful
liberalisation programme, according to the "stabilise-first"











successful. It was aimed at clamping down on inflation through
a reduction of aggregate demand, and reducing real exchange rate
fluctuations, but it resulted in an adverse reduction in output,
increased unemployment and appreciation of real exchange rates.
4.2.2 Argentina
In 1976, the military government was faced with an economy
fraught with relative price distortions, on the brink of hyper-
inflation and default, with seriously deteriorated public sector
finance and a highly disorganized financial system.
The main goals of the economic authorities in 1976 when they
undertook reform were to open the economy to foreign trade and
to reduce inflation (Fernandez, 1985). As in Uruguay, Argentina
followed the "liberalise-first" strategy: Stabilisation was
preceded by the opening of the capital account.
As in Uruguay and Chile, early in 1978, the authorities
introduced published schedules of future exchange rates that
implied daily rates of depreciation for their exchange rates that
were below the existing difference between domestic and foreign
rates of inflation (Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993).
The stabilisation policy objective, to control inflationary
pressures, was not accomplished. The plan was eventually











an important financial crisis had developed during the second
quarter of 1980 (Corbo, de Melo and Tybout, 1986). Second, a
deterioration of fiscal discipline that could no longer assure
coherence between the deficit and the preannounced schedule. With
the abandonment of the stabilisation schedule, new commercial and
exchange rate measures were gradually introduced, reversing the
policy of opening the economy to foreign trade. The financial
reform (and capital account liberalisation) was reversed in 1982
with virtual nationalisation of deposits.
The failure of the Argentine stabilisation plan gives credence
to the idea that any attempt to cure inflation needs a sound
programme of fiscal discipline as a fundamental prerequisite. In
a country like Argentina with a long history of fiscal
irresponsibility, credibility in government is one of the
scarcest resources of all and a programme of stabilisation
should not rely on credibility.
The preannouncement of future exchange rates in particular is a
highly risky policy because it requires commitments from the
government that might delay quick correction of policy mistakes.
4.2.3 Chile
After Allende's election in 1970, government directly or
indirectly took control of a substantial part of the financial
sector. The economy was shielded from foreign competition through











Policies changed dramatically when the military government took
over in 1973. During the ensuing two years the government
liberalised domestic commodity markets and started to liberalise
the domestic financial market. Capital controls were phased out
over a period of five years Contrary to both Uruguay and
Argentina, Chile adopted the simultaneous liberalisation and
stabilisation approach.
A major turning point was in February 1978, when the exchange
rate became the main instrument of stabilisation and an active
(preannounced) crawling peg was introduced. Three reasons were
behind the introduction of the active crawling peg system with
a decreasing rate of crawl.
* First, the system was supposed to reduce the expected rate
of inflation in the small open Chilean economy.
* Second, it was supposed to provide downward pressure in the
rate of increase in the price of tradeables and thus to help
reduce the stubborn inflation.
* Third, it was going to integrate capital markets further and
reduce domestic interest rates by reducing the expected rate of
devaluation.
As in Uruguay and Argentina, the stabilisation programme failed.
The reforms were abandoned in the early 1980s.
According to Corbo (1985), two major mistakes were made The
first occurred at the beginning of 1978 when the exchange rate











without due regard to the incentives for large capital inflows
that arose from this policy at a time when international capital
markets were very liquid.
Unlike Argentina and Uruguay, Chile had vast restrictions on the
capital account at the time of the introduction of the tablita.
Chile abolished capital controls in the belief that a freer
inflow of foreign funds would help bring down real interest
rates. However, high interest rates persisted. The tablita-
induced inflows increased absorption and drove up the prices of
nontradeables, thus raising the real exchange rate.
The second mistake occurred in the second half of 1981. The
persistent rise in the exchange rate, and the deterioration in
trade balances, led to expectations that the tablitas would not
be sustainable. This led to capital flight. After a large drop
in capital inflows, the authorities relied on an automatic
adjustment mechanism, by which the monetary squeeze from the
reduction in capital inflows would improve the exchange rate.
One of the lessons from the Chilean experience is that trade
liberalisations should be co-ordinated with other macropolicies
to avoid undue swings in real exchange rate. In particular, it
is too dangerous to use the exchange rate for stabilisation
because it soon works at cross purposes with the trade
liberalisation. In Chile the lack of basic rules for financial












4.3 General Reasons for the Failures
The above case studies emphasise the point made at the beginning
of this study: capital account liberalisation cannot be dealt
with in isolation from other intimately related phenomena. In
Uruguay and Argentina capital controls were abolished at the
beginning of the reforms with stabilisation following thereafter.
The cases, therefore, suggest that it is necessary to deal with
the status of macroeconomic stability before opening the capital
account. The main reason for the reform failures in all three
countries, however, is the introduction of the tablita (a
preannounced exchange rate).
The adoption of the tablitas was resorted to after the basic
objective of the stabilisation policies, the control of
inflationary pressures, was not attained. The tablitas were
viewed as a mechanism for conveying the governments' commitment
to reduce inflation and, thus, influence expectations about
inflation (Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993).
The rate of depreciation of the exchange rate declined with the
introduction of the tablitas. This resulted in the spread between
domestic interest rates (adjusted for the preannounced rate of
depreciation of the exchange rate) and external interest rates
widened, which increased domestic residents' incentive to borrow
external funds to finance domestic expenditures. The resulting











accompanied by comparatively slow declines in inflation and real
exchange rate appreciations.
The real exchange rates, by the end of 1980, in Uruguay,
Argentina, and Chile had appreciated by 67%, 74%, and 37%,
respectively relative to their values before the tablitas were
introduced. The trade balances deteriorated further with the
appreciation of the real exchange rates, which resulted in
expectations that the preannounced exchange rate regime would not
be sustainable (Corbo, de Melo and Tybout, 1986). These
developments eventually undermined the credibility of the reform
programmes, "which was manifested in capital flight; in the
abandonment of the tablitas by Argentina in early 1981, by Chile
in June 1982, and by Uruguay in November 1982; and in a series
of financial crises in the early 1980s" (Mathieson and Rojas-
Suarez, 1993: 25).
The above experiences have led some analysts to attribute the
ultimate unsustainability of the capital account liberalisations
to inconsistencies between the tablitas and other macroeconomic,
incomes, and financial policies. As the inconsistencies between
the macroeconomic policies became more progressively apparent,
capital flight, a balance of payments crisis, and the abandonment
of the stabilisation plan resulted.
Other reasons for the failures as pointed out by Cho and
Khatkhate (1989) are: First, the authorities did not recognise











financial markets had certain inborn limitations. Second, the
abolition of restrictions on the capital account were premature.













Problems of Capital Inflows: Case for Controls
Although it is usually assumed that developing countries will be
net capital exporters in the absence of controls, recent
experiences in Latin America have shown that even highly indebted
countries can experience capital inflows which can in turn create
problems (see e g Calvo et. al, 1993).
5.1 General Observations on Problems of Inflows
Harberger (1982) observes that (by definition) the arrival of new
real capital from abroad increases the current account deficit.
This is not necessarily a problem depending on what the inflow
is financing. If it is used for consumption only, then it can
have negative consequences. But the inflow that is channelled to
productive investment is not necessarily problematic because the
resulting returns can be used for debt servicing.
Edwards (1987), on the other hand, contends that if major capital
inflows are allowed, there is a possibility that the
liberalisation episodes will be aborted. This can happen when the
flow of capital adjusts "perversely" to the state of the economy
(Williamson, 1991). That is, when capital flows exacerbate
cyclical instability. In the South African case, for example, a
fall in the gold price would erode confidence and so prompt a











low price of gold. Clearly, since this is not palatable to the
objectives of capital account liberalisation (i.e. increased
growth and efficiency), a reversal of the whole episode could
occur.
5.2 Recent Developments in Latin America
Chapter 4 focuses on the failures of the '70s and '80s reform
initiatives of the Southern Cone. However, recently there have
been some potentially positive developments in Latin America.
This section looks at some of these developments, the reasons
behind them, and the prospects for the future. The idea is to
highlight the possible harmful effects of the inflows and thus
the possible need for capital controls.
5.2.1 The Nature of Recent Developments
In 1990 the economies of Latin America were still in serious
crisis, with widespread macroeconomic imbalances that involved
large budget deficits, very high inflation and even
hyperinflation. In 1994 growth is up, and inflation and budget
deficits are down. As a result, there is a feeling that the
crisis is over. There are two significant developments that have
contributed to this scenario.
First is a sudden and marked reversal of capital movements. There
have been a large increase in financial flows to Latin America.











estimated to have increased from $40 billion in 1991 to about $57
billion in 1992 (UNCTAD, 1993). These inflows consisted not only
of external financing from non-residents but also of substantial
amounts of repatriated flight capital. The inflows, accompanied
by trade liberalisation, have caused imports and domestic
absorption to increase substantially. From 1990 to 1992, imports
of Latin America grew at an annual rate of 17.4 percent in value
and 14.9 percent in volume
As noted in Calvo et al.'s (1993) study, in most countries, the
capital flows have been accompanied by booming stock and real
estate markets, an accumulation of international reserves, a
strong recovery of secondary-market prices for foreign loans, and
faster economic growth. Since the beginning of the 1990s growth
has accelerated in Latin America, averaging 2.3 percent annually
for 1990-1992 (UNCTAD, 1993). However, this growth is still
relatively slow. It implies a small increase in per capita
income.
Also, capital inflows are often associated with an upward push
in inflation because they raise the money supply and spending.
This, however, did not happen in Latin America in part because
of the sterilisation of the effect of capital inflows on the
stock of money.
Second, although domestic reform partly explains the forceful
return of Latin America to the international financial markets,











renewal of capital flows to Latin America is due to external
factors, external shocks common to the region. Some of these
shocks were such conditions as the recession in the United
States, and the interest rate arbitrage between the United States
dollar rates and generally substantially higher ones in the Latin
American countries' markets (UNCTAD, 1993). A significant fall
in the interest rate bill resulted in annual interest rate
payments on external debt from the region falling from $28.5
billion in 1988-1989 to around $23 billion in 1991-1992.
5.2.2 Some Problems with the Inflows
Although the external financial inflows have been associated with
reductions of financial costs, they have also complicated
monetary, fiscal and trade policy. These inflows have exerted
upward pressure on the exchange rate, with a gradual loss for the
countries' competitiveness and their capacity to attract foreign
direct investment (FDI) in sectors producing tradeables.
Moreover, a worsening of the external accounts poses a risk of
a further deterioration through financial outflows as arbitrage
profits, dependent in part on high domestic exchange rates, are
eliminated. In these circumstances the government may find that
it is losing its control over key economic variables such as
exchange and interest rates, and may also be confronted with a











5.2.3 Prospects for the Future
It is unlikely that capital inflows will continue at their recent
pace. Since lower interest rates in the United States have played
a major role in capital inflows to Latin America, their expected
rise would therefore discourage these flows, particularly to
countries with close financial relations with the United States.
In addition, the current composition of exchange rates, interest
rates and stock prices behind the recent capital influx cannot
be expected to last (UNCTAD, 1993).
Clearly, capital inflows have played a much smaller role in
stability and growth in some Latin American countries than in
others. In Chile, for example, growth and stability had been
achieved by the mid-1980s, i.e. before the advent of the capital
inflows. Therefore, what happens to inflows in future will have
a minimal impact on these countries. In countries such as Brazil,
on the other hand, where capital flows have had a significant
role, a decline in capital inflows may be expected to facilitate
fiscal adjustment and disinflation since foreign exchange has
never been a major constraint since the mid-1980s.
5.3 Policy Implications: Measures to Reduce the Inflows
The concern in this section is the form and timing of appropriate
policy responses to capital inflows. Calvo et al. (1993) mention












(1) the adverse effects of capital inflows on the export sector;
(2) massive capital inflows in particular may not be properly
intermediated and may therefore lead to a misallocation of
resources; and
(3) the "hot money" variety of capital inflows may be reversed
on short notice and possibly lead to a domestic financial
crisis.
The rest of this section therefore explores the grounds for these
concerns and their policy implications.
5.3.1 Reasons for the Concerns
Export Sector
The export sector is important in most Latin American countries
because its development has laid the foundations for
technological advancement and economic growth. Moreover, the
creditworthiness of highly indebted countries has been indicated
by the behaviour of exports. As a result, changes in exports
associated with capital inflows might have economywide effects
which cannot be internalised by the private sector and thus
warrant policy intervention.
Improper Intermediation
Calvo et al. note that improper intermediation could be the
result of speculative "bubbles", lack of policy credibility,











nominal wage or price rigidity), or some combination of the
above.
Ouick reversal of the Inflows
A reversal of the inflows may exacerbate the negative effects of
improper intermediation, or actually give  rise to improper
intermediation. Because of asymmetric information, a sudden
capital outflow may lead lenders to conclude that the country has
suffered a negative supply shock, even when none has occurred.
Such a sudden capital flight might result in the termination of
important investment projects.
5.3.2 Interventionist Policies
Based on the above concerns, Calvo et al. (1993) explore five
interventionist policies: (1) a tax on capital imports; (2) trade
policy; (3) fiscal tightening; (4) sterilised and nonsterilised
intervention by the central bank; and (5) a rise in the marginal
reserve requirements on bank deposits and more regulated bank
investments in equity and real estate markets.
Taxing
Israel (1978) and Chile (1991) are some of the countries that
have used taxes on short-term borrowing abroad This method is
effective in the short-run. In the long-run private agents find












Trade policy measures can also help insulate the export sector
from real exchange rate appreciation by ,for example, paying
higher export subsidies. As an example of this in the South
African context, the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS)
formula includes the compensation to exporters for adverse real
exchange rate changes.
Tightening Fiscal Policy
Another policy reaction to massive capital inflows is to tighten
fiscal policy through higher taxes or through lower government
expenditure. This policy is unlikely to stop the capital inflow,
but it may lower aggregate demand and curb the inflationary
impact of capital inflows.
Lower government expenditure - particularly when directed to the
purchase of nontraded goods and services - has a direct impact
on aggregate demand, which is unlikely to be offset by an
expansion of private sector demand. A contraction of government
expenditure, however, is a sensitive political issue.
Sterilised Intervention
This has been the most popular policy response to the episode of
capital inflows in Latin America. With capital inflows, this type











central bank in exchange for foreign currencies and securities.
This policy does not necessarily stop private agents from
engaging in international loan transactions, but, if successful,
it does insulate the stock of domestic money from variations
associated with capital mobility.
Nonsterilised Intervention
Here, the central bank purchases the foreign exchange brought in
by the capital inflow in exchange for domestic money - as under
a fixed exchange rate. This policy can help avoid nominal
exchange rate appreciation and is likely to narrow the domestic-
foreign interest rate differential; however it is likely to
generate an increase in the domestic monetary base beyond the
central bank's target.
Marginal Reserve Requirements
Marginal reserve requirements could be sharply raised such that
they become higher as the maturity of deposits shortens. A 100
percent required reserve ratio could be imposed on deposits with
the shortest maturity. Although this method would impose a burden
on the banking system and could result in some disintermediation
of the capital inflows, it has the advantage of decreasing banks'











5 3 3 Conclusion
Based on the analysis and the above policy recommendations, Salvo
et al. (1993) conclude that there are grounds to support a mix
of policy intervention based on the imposition of a tax on short-
term bank deposits. Furthermore, they argue that the likely
fiscal costs make it hard to argue for sterilised intervention,
unless countries exhibit a strong fiscal stance and capital
inflows are expected to be short-lived. Moreover, the authors
believe that none of the aforementioned policies will drastically
change the behaviour of real exchange rates or interest rates.
5.4 Suggestions for International Collaboration in Reducing
Inflows 
As an additional measure to stem detrimental inflows into
developing countries, Felix (1993) has proposed that there should
be collaboration from the advanced economies in reducing
destabilising effects of international capital mobility on the
developing countries. This is further necessitated by the fact
that these destabilising effects also affect the developed
countries albeit to a lesser degree.
Felix's proposal for international co-operation outlines new
mechanisms and changes in existing ones (see Appendix 1). He
suggests using collaborative bank supervisory mechanisms such as
an internationally uniform transaction tax on foreign exchange












reduce capital flight and tax evasion on foreign assets.
Developing countries should join such initiatives as the
agreements of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and












The South African Experience
The previous chapters have indicated that the lifting of capital
controls is not a straightforward issue. Policymakers have to
choose among various alternative paths. The "correct" sequencing
is central in making a decision. However, establishing capital
account convertibility is important especially for a developing
country like South Africa. The benefits in terms of employment,
technology transfers and access to foreign markets are enormous.
In an attempt to determine the suitable sequence of capital
account reforms, whether capital controls should be phased out
or abolished instantly, this chapter first looks at the nature
of controls that exist in South Africa; the Financial Rand
Mechanism is discussed in this part.
After establishing the importance of capital account
convertibility, the conditions necessary for a successful
liberalisation are discussed, and whether they have already been
accomplished in South Africa. Here the status of the current












6.1 The Nature of the Controls'
In South Africa there are mainly two forms of controls on capital
movements: quantitative controls (which mainly affect residents)
and the financial rand mechanism. By and large, they affect
residents, non-residents, emigrants and immigrants in different
ways (Garner, 1994).
Regarding residents, direct outward investment by companies, for
example, is considered by Exchange Control in the light of
national interest. Annual financial statements are to be
submitted. All net income is to be repatriated except with
special permission, and all share capital is to be transferred
through the financial rand.
Concerning portfolio investment, new purchases of foreign
currency by South African residents, like all other purchases of
foreign capital assets, are subject to Exchange Control approval,
which is usually denied. Interest on existing holdings must be
repatriated.
Pertaining to non-residents, direct investment may be made and
disinvestment must be made using the financial rand which
requires Exchange Control approval. Purchases of residential
property, farms and items other that fixed assets are forbidden.
Profits and dividends are transferred with the commercial rand.












Also, foreign companies have stipulated gearing requirements.
Portfolio investment by non-residents, such as purchasing quoted
securities, may be done with the financial rand without Exchange
Control approval, and quoted securities are endorsed "non-
resident" to prevent their sale outside the financial rand
mechanism. When they are sold funds must be deposited in a
financial rand account; and dividends and interest are paid in
commercial rand.
6.2 The Financial Rand Mechanism'
This is a two-tier exchange rate system that consists of the
Commercial Rand and the Financial Rand. The commercial rand is
used mainly for current account transactions while the financial
rand is used by non-residents for certain categories of capital
account transactions. It is a freely floating exchange rate
(apart from limited SARB intervention) determined by the supply
and demand for capital flows. [See Garner (1994) for fuller
discussion].
The finrand mechanism is a form of exchange control on the
movement of investment capital to and from South Africa. This
arrangement is part of a whole group of rules and regulations
designed to monitor and/or restrict the outflow of capital. The
crucial difference between the commercial rand and the finrand
is that payments through the former reduce foreign reserves,











whereas because finrand transactions are transactions between
non-residents, payments through this mechanism do not affect
South Africa's reserves.
Apart from insulating th capital account from outflows of foreign
exchange, the financial rand also has the effect of partially
insulating domestic interest rates (Kahn, 1994; Garner, 1994).
The finrand rate is largely influenced by the level of foreign
investor confidence in South Africa's economic prospects. Over
the years, this confidence has fluctuated with political shocks.
In the 1980s, for example, political disturbances led to large
foreign disinvestment from South Africa. The current uncertainty
about the state of the country after the April 27 elections has
left foreign investors quite ambivalent. They are unsure whether
the present political stability will last, and thus are not
willing to make long-term investments lest the country reverts
back to political instability.
The dismantling of apartheid legislation since 1990 helped to
slightly increase the foreigners interest in South Africa. The
renewed confidence began to decline as violence escalated in the
past four years. Hence, new investments subsided.
The above discussion clearly indicates that the financial rand
market is volatile (see Figure 1). The Reserve Bank sought to
reduce this volatility in 1992 by announcing its aim to intervene




















system was ultimately being discarded; a perception which would
have encouraged foreign investment into the country.
However, the downside to the interventionist strategy is that
such intervention is at the expense of foreign exchange reserves
if the SARB is intervening to prevent a depreciation of the rate.
6.3 The Importance of Liberalisation
One of the important benefits of liberalisation is increased
trade and foreign investment (Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993).
Capital account opening, in particular, will not only improve
integration into the international financial system, but it will
also send a strong signal to foreign investors to invest in South
Africa. Also, the general international trend including African
countries is towards liberalisation in order to remove the
negative signal that controls give for foreign investment.
However, as seen in chapter 3, there is a need to sequence
liberalisation.
6.3.1 encin
Having noted the need for the elimination of SA capital
controls, the challenge becomes the sequencing and timing of the
liberalisation process. In chapter 3 the following general
sequencing is recommended: the current account first, followed
by the domestic financial sector, and then the capital account.











there are controls on various capital account transactions.
Below, the status of the current account and the domestic
financial sector is considered to assess whether capital account
opening can be undertaken.
6.3.1.1 Current Account
The current account in South Africa is less controlled than the
capital account. During 1984-93, the current account surplus as
a percentage of GDP was at an average annual rate of 1.94, whilst
net capital inflows were -1.71% of GDP [Appendix 2(a)]. Although
South Africa does have very high tariffs for certain narrow
categories, the average tariff is not excessively high by
international standards.
However, complexity is one of the main problems with South
Africa's trade regime. Of thirty-two developing countries for
which the World Bank has comparable data, South Africa has most
tariff rates, and the widest range (Belli et al., 1993).
The recent SA offer to the General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) promises even more liberalisation of the trade account
(Hirsh, 1994). Therefore, as discussed in chapter 3, the SA
current account might already be liberalised enough to permit











6.3.1.1 The financial sector
Significant liberalisation in the South African financial sector
has already taken place during Dr. Gerhardt de Kock's term as
Governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). As shown in
table 1, especially since 1988, real interest rates have been
positive which implies that no real financial repression exists.
No interest rate ceilings exist. Interest rates are market
determined although SARB still sets the bank rate.
6.3.2 Other Preconditions for Liberalisation
According to the Normative Economic Model (NEM), four
preconditions need to be met before capital account opening:
(a) the building up of gold and foreign exchange reserves to
adequate levels;
(b)the attainment of domestic financial stability, including low
inflation;
(c) the replacement of interim debt arrangements with normal
arrangements; and
(d) the further development of a flexible South African
foreign exchange market, by allowing and expanding controlled
wider ownership of foreign exchange in the hands of accredited












South African Real Interest Rates (Discount) Compared with those








1975 -7.36 -2.90 -13.17 -1.47 -4.34
1976 -3.73 -0.22 -5.01 -1.04 -2.94
1 977 -3.45 -0.95 -8.32 -0.42 -2.99
1978 -2.34 0.07 0.30 0.37 -5.20
1979 -7.82 -0.83 -0.41 0.35 1.59
1980 -9.04 -1.78 -2.96 1.77 0.15
1981 -5.45 2.95 1.15 1.60 1.42
1982 0.81 4.65 2.26 1.73 2.85
1983 0.99 5.30 5.11 1.17 3.45
1984 7.70 3.72 4.34 1.89 2.72
1985 -3.20 3.90 4.87 1.80 3.00
1986 -7.10 3.60 7.69 3.70 2.40
1987 -6.60 2.30 4.87 2.20 2.50
1988 1.60 2.50 5.77 2.30 1.80
1989 3.30 2.20 3.42 3.20 1.95
1990 3.60 1.10 1.49 3.30 2.90
1991 1.70 -0.70 3.99 4.50 1.20
1992 0.10 0.00 3.69 4.25 1.55
1993 2.70 0.20 5.02 2.55 0.60
Source: IMF Financial Statistics, various issues
The NEM seems to suggest that the main stumbling block towards
liberalisation is getting the adequate level of foreign exchange
reserves. It further asserts that substantial progress towards












Caution is necessary when determining the "adequate" level of
foreign exchange reserves. As Garner (1994) argues, one of the
reasons the finrand was reintroduced in 1985 was the fact that
the authorities undermined the level of reserves that were
necessary to defend a unitary exchange rate in the case of
political instability. Undertaking radical reform in a weak net
reserve position left the SARB unable to defend the rand from
attack during political instability.
The current South African net reserve position as shown in Table
2 is not strong. Therefore, according to Garner (1994), if a
significant amount of reserve losses is experienced net reserves











account and financial sector reforms will enable the open capital
account to be sustainable.
6.4 Sequencing Capital Account Reforms
Since capital account controls can be various, e.g. on residents
and non-residents as in South Africa, capital account
liberalisation might have to occur in stages (phased out).
However, there is a possibility of removing all controls
simultaneously; the "Big Bang" approach.
6.4.1 Phasina out Capital Controls
The main problem of capital account reform in South Africa are
major capital outflows that can result particularly from
institutions such as pension funds and insurance schemes who
control most of the domestic savings in the country (Kahn, 1994).
Their investment in the South African economy has been enforced
by controls. Had the controls to be lifted, these institutions
would reallocate their funds and thus drain the country of the
much sought finance.
Therefore a gradualist policy of sequencing this liberalisation
could be implemented to mitigate the impact of the outflows. The
sequencing of the capital account could take the form of each
year increasing the percentage that domestic residents can invest
abroad with the hope that there will also be reciprocal inflows











The abolition of capital controls should be on non-residents in
order to encourage them to invest in the country. As discussed
in section 6.1, non-residents are subject to the financial rand
mechanism in their direct and portfolio investments (Garner,
1994). But the financial rand mechanism, insofar as portfolio
investments are concerned, serves to increase the returns because
all dividends and interests are repatriated freely at the
commercial rand rate, thus increasing the effective return to
non-residents by the amount of the discount between the
commercial rate and the financial rate.
6.4.2 Simultaneous Lifting of All Controls
What of the proposal that all controls could be lifted
simultaneously (the "Big Bang" approach)? Given the current
uncertainty and instability in South Africa, it is unlikely that
the scrapping of all controls will change the current level of
capital inflows. The SARB reported on 8 April 1994 that the gold
and foreign exchange reserves declined by almost R900-million in
the previous month to R7,93-billion from R8,8-billion in February
1994. The large net outflow of short-term funds from South Africa
can be ascribed to unfavourable leads and lags in foreign
payments and receipts, as a result of the strength of the US
dollar on international foreign exchange markets and sustained
downward pressure on the value of the rand (SARB Ouartelv
Bulletin, March 1994). Domestic unrest, political and social












Given the current rate of outflows from South Africa, it is
highly conceivable that if capital controls were to be suddenly
lifted, there would be a net outflow of capital resulting in
abandonment of the reform as it happened in the Southern Cone of
Latin America.
Also, the influence that external incentives, such as high US
interest rates, would have on South Africa is to exacerbate
capital flight. As mentioned in chapter 2, incentives in
industrial countries would encourage South African residents to
invest their assets in these recipient countries.
6.5 Conclusion
Having established the need for capital account liberalisation,
and accepting the "current-account-first" approach of sequencing,
then there is an option of either phasing out the opening of the
capital account itself, or opting for the "Big Bang" approach.
In trying to choose between the gradualist and the "Big Bang"
approaches what will happen to domestic savings in the process
needs to be considered. If the gradualist approach is chosen,
domestic capital must be retained by firstly phasing out
restrictions on non-residents in order to attract foreign
investment, and then removing restrictions on residents in the












However, if the simultaneous approach is chosen, there is no
guarantee that the inflows will offset outflows. The outflows
might outweigh inflows, prompting perhaps a reversal of the whole
capital account liberalisation. On the balance of
probabilities,therefore, the gradualist approach is more
reasonable, and it is recommendable for South Africa particularly
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Some Mechanisms to Increase the Net Benefits to Developing
Economies from International Capital Mobility by Curbing its
Destabilising Effects
A. An international uniform transaction tax on foreign 
exchange transaction
This was proposed by James Tobin 6 16 years ago, and the tax
would be structured as follows:
(1) It would have a uniform rate and at least be applied by
all the key currency countries.
(2) The tax would be administered by each government on all 
payments by residents within its jurisdiction that involve
a spot exchange currency.
(3) Proceeds from the tax would be paid into a central fund,
controlled by the IMF or World Bank.
(4) With IMF consent, small industrialised countries and
developing countries that are formally part of currency
areas, or have tied their currency to one of the key
currencies, could be exempted from the tax.
Apart from the favourable spillovers to the developing countries
from the greater macroeconomic stability that a tax such as the
one prosed by Tobin might bring to the industrialised countries,
the tax offers the following direct benefits to the developing
countries:
(1) It would help discourage capital flight by increasing its
transactions costs.
(2) The tax receipts centralised in the IMF or World Bank
could, if channelled properly as credits to developing
countries, be a welcome offset to the slackening of other
official loans and transfers from the industrialised
countries.
(3) It would mitigate the "financial Dutch disease"' that
occasionally afflicts developing economies.
5Source: Felix (1993)
6 This international transaction tax was seen by Tobin as a
restriction to the rampant international financial mechanism.
7 Financial Dutch Disease refers to a situation in which
excessive short-term financial inflows appreciate the real
exchange rate to the extent of undermining the government's
export-oriented growth strategy, whilst also increasing the money











Annendix 1 8 (continued)
B. Using collaborative bank supervisory mechanisms to reduce tax evasion on foreign ass ts
Felix (1993) maintains that collaborative bank supervision is
particularly beneficial to developing countries in order to gain
better control over two interrelated problems of their own with
international banks: their inadequate "governability" over the
local branches and subsidiaries of large multinational banks, and
the ease with which these local affiliates function as conduits
for capital flight and other evasionary activities.
The following are some of the proposals that could enhance
collaborative bank supervision between the industrialised and
developing countries:
The following are some of the proposals that could enhance
collaborative bank supervision between the industrialised and
developing countries:
(1) The developing countries that are pressed by major
industrial countries to remove restrictions on the entry
of multinational banks should insist that all such entries
be conditional on
(a) that each petitioning bank formally contract to adhere
faith fully to the Basle Committee's December 1988
recommendations on bank ethics in all its host
country activities, the contract also authorising
that
(i) the supervisory authorities of the host
developing country may apply penalties, including
closure, for contract violations;
(ii) the bank and/or its home country may appeal the
penalties to the World Court, but may accept its
judgement as final, and agree not to engage in
any unilateral retaliation against the host
country prior to or after the Court's ruling.
(b) In accordance with the Basle Committee's July 1992
recommendations on the exchange of information between
home and host bank supervisory authorities, the home
country shall agree to make best effort responses to
all requests for information about the activities of
the multinational bank from the host developing
country's supervisory authority that it deems needed
for adequate supervision of the activities of the
bank's local affiliate.
(2) The Basle Committee should extend its 1988 and 1992
recommendations:
(a) to cover tax fraud;












Appendix 1 9 (continued)
cross-border operations of multinational banks;
(c) to expand the committee to include representatives of
regional developing country supervisory groups, such
as the South-East Asia, New Zealand and Australia
group and the Commission of Supervisory Authorities
of Latin America and the Caribbean.
(3) These regional groups should develop coherent group
positions on how to improve their members' governability
of the cross-border banking affiliates they host. The
purpose is to:
(a) educate members on using the existing international
facilities to strengthen governability;
(b) to instruct their representatives on the Basle
Committee.
(c) negotiate with the Basle Committee on governability
matters on behalf of their members, should formal
membership be rejected.
C. Usina the exchange of tax information agreements
To promote the exchange of tax information among the developing
countries, and between them and the developed countries, Felix
suggests:
(1) the current developing country signatories should
strengthen their existing laws on the taxing of foreign
assets as required in order to make full use of the
opportunities to collect such taxes provided by the
Agreement.
(2) The agreements should be amended to specifically enjoin
the signatory governments from issuing bearer bonds or
other instruments that facilitate tax evasion.
(3) Other developing countries within the United States orbit
should seek similar agreements with the United States,
strengthening their tax laws appropriately to maximize
fiscal benefits.
(4) There should be a proposal of a convention to
multilaterilise the tax agreements, with convention
signatories - industrial and developing country - agreeing













Current Account Balance and Capital Flows in South Africa
(In percentage of GDP)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Trade
Balance 2.7 10.0 10.8 9.0 6.0 6.0 6.2 5.2 3.9 4.3
Current








-1.3 -2.6 0.7 1.9 -1.8 -0.5 1.1 1.3 0.1 -2.8






























0 2,832 29.5 13,015 56.0
1-10 2,466 25.6 4,954 21.3
11-15 922 9.6 1,224 5.3
16-20 1,956 20.3 2,484 10.7
21-25 743 7.7 664 2.9
26-30 505 5.3 544 2.3
31-35 75 0.8 77 0.3
36-40 100 1.0 253 1.1
40+ 16 0.2 27 0.1
Total 2,615 100.0 23,242 100.0






























Manufactured products 26.9 13.4 40.3
Capital goods 9.8 10.0 20.2












Some proposed options for the reform of the financial rand
mechanism
1. Unify the exchange rates. Allow full convertibility of
all current and capital transactions for residents and non-
residents.
2. Unify the exchange rates. Allow full convertibility for
all current and capital transactions for non-residents, and
liberalize existing controls on residents. For example
foreign direct investment could be allowed, but portfolio
investment disallowed.
3. Unify the exchange rates. Allow full convertibility for
all current and capital transactions for non-residents, but
maintain existing controls on residents.
4. Convert the current dual exchange rate system into one
where all capital flows take place in one currency, which is
purely market determined, and all current flows take place
in another, in which SARB intervenes Liberalize existing
capital controls on residents and non-residents.
5. Unify the exchange rates. Allow full convertibility for
all current and capital transactions of non-residents, but
tighten existing controls on residents. For example limit
foreign direct investment overseas.
6. Convert the current dual exchange rate system into one
where all capital flows take place in one currency, which is
purely market determined, and all current flows take place
in another in which the SARB intervenes. Maintain existing
capital controls.
7. Unify the exchange rates. Allow full convertibility for
all current transactions of non-residents, but introduce
other controls on non-resident capital flows, and tighten
existing controls on residents.
8. Maintain the current dual exchange rate system, including
the need for approval to use the financial rand mechanism
for disinvestment. Undertake a phased removal of the
provision allowing non-residents to earn interest in














Some proposed options for the reform of the financial rand
mechanism
9. Maintain the current dual exchange rate system. Keep the
rules governing non-residents the same, but allow residents
access to financial rand only for capital outflows to
neighbouring countries without approval.






















i) No outward investment allowed for
individuals.
ii) Outward investment by companies is
considered by Exchange Control in the
light of national interest. Annual
financial statements are to be
submitted. All net income is to be
repatriated except with special
permission. All share capital is to be




i) No outward investment is allowed,
except a small allowance in financial
rand to take up rights on shares
already owned.
ii) New purchases of foreign currency
bonds by South African residents, like
all other purchases of foreign capital
assets, are subject to Exchange Control
approval, which is not normally given.




i) Bank loans from residents to non-
residents are subject to Exchange
Control approval, which is usually only
given if related to approved inward
investment by a non-resident company.
All flows take place in commercial
rand.
ii) See the discussion of trade finance
below for rules affecting bank's













Appendix  4(a) (continued)
A simplified view of South Africa's capital controls
(3) ...(contd) iii) Non-resident wholly owned
subsidiaries may borrow locally up to
50% of their shareholders investment
(equity, profits, and loans from
abroad). Where the company is not
wholly owned, the greater the local
interest is in the company the more can
be borrowed. This regulation applies
also where guarantees are given by
non-residents However, Exchange
Control will allow excess facilities
under some circumstances and if local
interest is more than 75%, the company
is no longer affected by this
regulation. Loans can be made by
authorized dealers but must be reported
to Exchange Control. All flows take
place in commercial rand
(4)
Bank Deposits
South African residents are allowed to
hold overseas bank deposits, but all
interest must be transferred to the
CMA. All new acquisitions of capital
assets, and hence new bank deposits,




Are mainly covered by the same
restrictions as bank loans.
(6)
Migrant flows
i) Emigrants are permitted a small cash
allowance (R15,000) in commercial rand,
equal to the annual travel allowance,
and a settling in allowance (R100,000)
in financial rand. They are also
allowed to export certain items, with
value up to R100,000, as long as they
have been held for one year.
ii) If an emigrant's net declared total
assets in South Africa, excluding
allowances, are more than R200,000, or
application to export further assets is














A simplified view of South Africa's capital controls
(6) ...(contd) iii) Remaining assets are held in a
"blocked account" with an authorized
dealer, and may only be used for
expenses incurred in South Africa.
Income from these assets can be
remitted overseas up to a maximum of
R300,000. Transfer can be in
Commercial or financial rand at
Exchange Control's discretion.
(7) i) A South African exporter requires
Trade finance approval from an authorized dealer to
provide a trade finance facility with
a maturity of more than 6 months.
Approval from Exchange Control is
required for facilities of more than
12 months All flows mainly take
place in commercial rand
ii) Banks making loans to overseas
importers and exporters are subject












A simplified view of South Africa's capital controls
Direction of original





i) Investment may be made and
disinvestment must be made using the
financial rand. Exchange Control
approval is needed. Purchases of
residential property, farms and
items other than fixed assets are
forbidden. Profits and dividends are
transferred with commercial rand.
Foreign companies have stipulated
gearing requirements.
ii) Investment in other CMA
countries with financial rand is
allowed, but a detailed application
must be made to Exchange Control
(2) i) Quoted securities may be
Portfolio Investment purchased with financial rand
without Exchange Control approval.
Quoted securities are endorsed "non-
resident" to prevent their sale
outside the financial rand
mechanism. When they are sold funds
must be deposited in a financial
rand account. Dividends and interest
are paid in commercial rand.
ii) Purchases of unquoted securities
need Exchange Control approval. For
those in new companies, the
expansion of manufacturing capacity
and low gearing will be viewed
favourably. Profits and dividends
are paid through the commercial
rand.
iii) Switches from quoted to non-
quoted securities are not allowed.
Sales of securities must be credited
to a financial rand account.
iv) Public sector foreign currency
bond debt was excluded from the Debt
Standstill of end August 1985.
Repayments of principal and interest












Appendix  4(h) [continued]
A simplified view of South Africa's capital controls
(3)
Bank loans
i) Repayment of all bank loans
outstanding at end of August 1985,
and not guaranteed by a foreign
government or export credit agency,
were halted and have been subjected
to the Debt Standstill. Under
various interim arrangements, some
repayments on these loans have been
made, and at the creditors option,
some loans have been converted to
long term loans not subject to the
Debt Standstill, and some have been
paid in financial rand. Interest has
always been pain on time in
commercial rand.
ii) New non-resident bank loans to
South African residents require
prior approval from Exchange Control
(except for trade finance) to avoid
bunching of loan maturities, but are
normally approved. Longer maturity
loans are welcomed, and early
repayment is not generally allowed.
Working capital loans of less than 3
months are not approved. Facilities
may not be extended without
approval. Capital and interest flows
are made in commercial rand
iii) Repayments of loans from a
foreign bank to finance a South
African firm's overseas subsidiary
must be made with financial rand if
they were for capital expenditure;
if they were for current expenses
they should be paid with profits
generated overseas, or with Exchange
Control approval from the parent
using commercial rand
(4) Investments with authorized South
Bank Deposits African banks can be made with
financial rand without Exchange
Control approval. Interest is mainly













A simplified view of South Africa's capital controls
(5)
Other loans
i) Loans made before end August
1985, which were not from or
guaranteed by a foreign government
or export credit agency, have been
subject to the Debt Standstill.
ii) Loans from non-resident share-
holders to South African companies
may not be made without Exchange
Control approval. Equity must
generally exceed 1/3 of borrowings
where the company is non-resident
controlled. Loans from non-residents
increase local borrowing capacity of
company.
iii) Loans from other non-residents
are largely treated as bank loans
(6) i) Immigrants taking up permanent
Migrant flows residence in South Africa must
declare to an authorised dealer any
foreign currency and assets which
they own, and must keep Exchange
Control informed of their ownership
of foreign assets.
ii) Immigrants arriving since Sept.
1990 are allowed to dispose of or
invest their foreign assets for a
period of 5 years before become
subject to Exchange Control as
residents. Within one year of
arrival they are allowed to
introduce a maximum of R500,00 of
capital via the financial rand
mechanism, to be used for the
purchase of property or a motor
vehicle. Other inflows are subject
to the rule governing foreign
investors. All income from foreign














A simplified view of South Africa's capital controls
(7)
Trade finance
i) Trade finance originating
directly from the supplier, or which
was guaranteed by a foreign
government or export credit agency,
was not subject to the Debt
Standstill of end August 1985.
ii) Foreign bank facilities for
periods of not more than 12 months
for financing exports from and
imports to South Africa are
classified as trade finance, and do
not require Exchange Control
approval  
Source: Garner (1994)
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